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Introduction
Pharmacoepidemiology explores “the use of and the effects of drugs
in large numbers of people.”1 The Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA)2 authorized the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to carry out a program of postmarketing drug
safety surveillance that relies heavily on pharmacoepidemiological studies
to assess safety risks with already-approved drugs.3 To implement this
†

Professor of Law and George Butler Research Professor; Director, Center
on Biotechnology & Law, University of Houston Law Center,
bjevans@central.uh.edu. This research was supported by grants from the
Greenwall Foundation Faculty Scholars Program in Bioethics and the
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1.

See Brian L. Strom, What is Pharmacoepidemiology?,
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY 3, 3 (Brian L. Strom ed., 4th ed. 2005).

2.

Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).

3.

21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii) (2012) (setting targets of twenty-five million
persons by July 2010 and 100 million by July 2012). See also id.
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program, the agency is developing the Sentinel system,4 a very largescale health information infrastructure, and its pilot phase, Mini-Sentinel
(together, Sentinel). Mini-Sentinel already includes health data for
ninety-nine million persons.5 Large-scale data infrastructures for
postmarketing drug safety surveillance also exist in Canada,6 the
European Union,7 and Japan.8

§ 355(k)(3)(C) (describing the new “postmarket risk identification and
analysis system”).
4.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/UCM12470
1.pdf (discussing the goals and structure of the Sentinel data network). See
also FDA’s Sentinel Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/default.htm
(last
modified Jan. 13, 2014) (providing information about the current status of
Sentinel System development).

5.

Lesley Curtis et al., Design Considerations, Architecture, and Use of the
Mini-Sentinel Distributed Data System, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY &
DRUG SAFETY 23, 28 (2012). See also Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., FDA Awards Contract to Harvard Pilgrim to Develop Pilot for
Safety
Monitoring
System
(Jan.
8,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm196
968.htm; Rachel E. Behrman et al., Developing the Sentinel System — A
National Resource for Evidence Development, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 498,
498 (2011).

6.

See About DSEN, CANADA INST. OF HEALTH RESEARCH, http://www.cihrirsc.gc.ca/e/39389.html (last modified October 14, 2012) (describing
Canada’s DSEN network).

7.

See Press Release, European Medicines Agency, EMEA-Coordinated
PROTECT Project Has Been Accepted for Funding by the Innovative
Medicines
Initiative
Joint
Undertaking
(Apr.
30,
2009),
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/
news_and_events/news/2009/11/news_detail_000096.jsp&jsenabled=true
(describing the PROTECT network); EUR. MEDS. AGENCY,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN TO FURTHER PROGRESS THE
EUROPEAN RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY: ROLLING TWO-YEAR WORK
PROGRAMME
(2008–2009)
(2007),
http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/phv/28008907en.pdf (describing
the ENCePP data network); What is ENCePP?, EUR. NETWORK OF CTRS.
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY
AND
PHARMACOVIGILANCE,
FOR
http://encepp.eu/structure/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); EUADR, http://www.alert-project.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (describing
the European Union adverse drug reactions data network).

8.

Kaoru Misawa, Dir., Office of Safety, Pharm. & Med. Devices Agency,
Address at the 9th Kitasato University-Harvard School of Public Health
Symposium: Sentinel Initiative in Japan: Utilization of Electronic Health
Information in Pharmacovigilance 7–14 (Sept. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.pharm.kitasato-u.ac.jp/biostatis/
khsympo200909/doc/misawa.pdf.
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Such systems present privacy and ethical issues that have been extensively discussed elsewhere.9 This article takes as its starting
assumptions that many members of the public support the goal of
reducing medical product injuries and that postmarketing surveillance
programs can advance that goal. The article explores the challenge of
ensuring a sustainable supply of data for these purposes and asks
whether recent amendments to the HIPAA Privacy Rule10 have met that
challenge. It concludes that the amendments move closer to but ultimately fall short of resolving this challenge.

I.

The Challenge of Sustainable Data Access

Raw patient health data ─the records of a patient’s encounters with
the healthcare system ─are not in themselves a very useful resource for
postmarketing surveillance of drugs and other medical products.11 To be
useful, each individual’s data must be longitudinally linked to create a
chronological record that reflects diagnoses, treatments (including which
medical
products
the
patient
used),
and
outcomes.12
Pharmacoepidemiological studies typically need longitudinal records for
large numbers of patients because the product-related injuries of interest
often are very rare, making it difficult to detect statistically significant
patterns between the use of specific medical products and specific
9.

See, e.g., KRISTEN ROSATI ET AL., HIPAA AND COMMON RULE COMPLIANCE
IN THE MINI-SENTINEL PILOT 1, 7 (2010), available at http://minisentinel.org/
work_products/About_Us/HIPAA_and_CommonRuleCompliance_in_th
e_Mini-SentinelPilot.pdf (examining privacy and human-subjects
protection laws affecting FDA’s postmarket drug safety surveillance
activities); KRISTEN ROSATI, AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO
STRUCTURING FDA SENTINEL INITIATIVE ACTIVITIES (2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480e4aa00
&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (same); Deven McGraw et
al., A Policy Framework for Public Health Uses of Electronic Health Data,
21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 18, 19 (2012) (describing
privacy and human-subject protections implemented by the FDA’s MiniSentinel pilot project); Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food and Drug
Administration to Require Data Access and Control Use Rights in the
Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67 (2010) [hereinafter Evans,
Authority of the FDA]; Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural
Model of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2009) [hereinafter
Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model].

10.

45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2013) (implementing privacy protections of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.)).

11.

Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 69, 90-92 (2011) [hereinafter Evans, Data Ownership].

12.

Id. at 93-94.
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injuries. Such studies sometimes require highly inclusive datasets that
capture data for most or all of the people who have been exposed to the
product. In some cases, even the small biases associated with letting
patients “opt in” or “opt out” of having their data used may materially
distort the study results.13 Postmarketing medical product safety
surveillance sometimes requires extremely large-scale information assets
encompassing longitudinally linked records for tens or hundreds of
millions of people.14
The various entities that hold raw health data, such as insurers and
healthcare providers, do not maintain patients’ health information in a
standardized format.15 Each dataset must be translated into a common
format before data from different sources can be linked longitudinally
(for individual patients) or meaningfully compared (across different
patients). This process requires significant inputs of skilled labor and
information infrastructure such as software systems.16 Once the datasets
are in a common format, they must be brought together so that they can
be used to answer specific questions about medical product safety.
Various system architectures can bring large amounts of data together.17 Perhaps the most obvious approach is to deposit the data in a
large, central database. Centralization of the large amount of data
required by medical product safety surveillance, however, has various
practical and privacy disadvantages.18 An alternative seen in many
recent postmarketing drug safety surveillance systems is to adopt a
distributed network architecture.19 In a distributed network, individuals’
health data stays at its original location, such as a healthcare provider’s
or insurer’s database. These data holders link their datasets together
virtually by converting their data into an agreed common format and
13.

Id. at 95-98.

14.

See, e.g., Curtis et al, supra note 5, at 28 (describing Mini-Sentinel’s
ninety-million-person data assets).

15.

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL
POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE
HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 39 (2010).

16.

Evans, Data Ownership, supra note 11, at 99-101.

17.

See HEALTHCARE INFO. AND MGMT. SYS. SOC’Y, A HIMSS GUIDE TO
PARTICIPATING IN A HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE 15–20 (2009),
available
at
http://www.himss.org/content/files/HIE/HIE_GuideWhitePaper.pdf
(discussing an array of possible architectures, including centralized,
decentralized (federated), and hybrid models).

18.

Carol C. Diamond et al., Collecting and Sharing Data For Population
Health: A New Paradigm, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 454, 456 (2009).

19.

See, e.g., Behrman et al., supra note 5, at 499 (describing the Sentinel
system’s distributed architecture).
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responding to queries using their respective data assets; these piecemeal
responses are then aggregated into an integrated response to the question at hand.20 In a distributed data network, data-holding institutions
are not just suppliers of data; they also supply services.21 The services
involve tasks such as: searching through their records to identify data
relevant to a specific query; retrieving that information and converting it
into the agreed common format; studying it to develop responses to the
query; and transmitting the results.22
Either option ─ creating centralized data assets or bringing data together virtually ─ requires significant investments of labor, information
infrastructure, and, of course, money. It is overly simplistic to portray
raw patient health data as valuable information assets in themselves.
Raw data are made valuable, for purposes of postmarketing safety
surveillance, only by investing labor and developing information infrastructure to facilitate the operations just described.
A critical question is how to incentivize the necessary investments in
information infrastructure so that the needed data resources will be
available on a sustainable basis now and in the future. Compulsory
approaches to data access are one way to procure data to use in
postmarketing surveillance: simply force data holders to make their data
available for these activities. This approach echoes Professor Marc
Rodwin’s proposal to enact legislation requiring data holders to report
data in de-identified form for creation of a publicly owned national
database to support various research and public health activities.23
Unfortunately, collecting raw, de-identified health data in a public
database would not by itself create a useful information asset for
postmarketing surveillance. To make the data useful, data holders also
would need to supply services and develop the infrastructure to convert
their data into a common format before reporting the data. Compulsory
provision of services –forcing civilians to do work for the government –is
fraught with legal problems in the United States’ system of law.24
Moreover, if each data holder reports the raw data in de-identified
20.

Evans, Data Ownership, supra note 11, at 99-101.

21.

Id. at 101.

22.

OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH IT, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE NHIN PROTOTYPE ARCHITECTURE 33 tbl.
6
(2007),
available
at
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/summary_report_on_nhin_pr
ototype_architectures.pdf (listing data services that health information
networks provide, such as “secure data delivery;” “data look-up, retrieval,
and location registries;” and “data anonymization”).

23.

Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36
AM. J.L. & MED. 586, 589 (2010) (arguing for public ownership of deidentified patient data).

24.

Evans, Data Ownership, supra note 11, at 106-07.
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format, the centralized database will not be able to link the data
longitudinally because at least some identifying information must be
shared in order to establish that data received from various sources
relate to the same individual.25 Compulsory sharing of health data in
identified form would raise serious privacy concerns.
An additional critique of compulsory approaches is that they may
not ensure sustainable access to data over the long term. Such approaches favor static efficiency over dynamic efficiency: static efficiency focuses
on how best to allocate rights to data that already exist today, whereas
dynamic efficiency focuses on ensuring adequate supplies of data for the
future.26 Entities that hold rich stores of health data often have invested
substantial sums of private capital to develop their datasets and related
infrastructures. Forcing them to donate their data may be statically
efficient in the sense of meeting today’s immediate needs for data, but it
also may destroy incentives for them to invest in developing data for
future uses.
Expropriating private assets has not been an effective approach in
other infrastructure industries where it has been tried. The U.S. is the
only nation that kept its large energy and resource infrastructures, such
as oil and gas pipelines, under private ownership throughout the twentieth century.27 Many nations around the world placed such assets under
governmental ownership during the middle decades of the twentieth
century.28 As that century ended, however, governments in many nations
were backing away from public ownership of these assets in an effort to
restore investment incentives and efficiencies lost through the earlier
expropriations.29 Forcing infrastructure investors to donate their information assets and services to the public understandably diminishes the
incentives to develop future assets. For this reason, compulsory data
access schemes seem unlikely to ensure sustainable supplies of data and
information infrastructure to support postmarketing surveillance activities on a long-term basis. And medical product safety is, if anything, a
25.

Evans, Authority of the FDA, supra note 9, at 76-77.

26.

Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom
and the Internet: the Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822,
1843 (2007).

27.

JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY,
CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION 4-6 (2003); Jim Chen, The Nature of the
Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1617, 1618 (2004).

28.

See Chen, supra note 27, at 1632 (quoting GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 27,
at 2).

29.

See Daniela Klingebiel & Jeff Ruster, Why Infrastructure Financing
Facilities Often Fall Short of Their Objectives (World Ban, Working Paper
No.
2358,
2000),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/
07/07/000094946_00062305373440/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
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long-term problem that requires ongoing study; it is not susceptible to a
one-time solution.
Because compulsory data access schemes have so many problems,
there is ongoing interest in non-compulsory (voluntary) approaches.
These can include both donative and market-oriented approaches.
Donative approaches rely on the goodwill of data holders to make their
data available gratis for use in postmarketing surveillance activities.
Market-oriented approaches are still voluntary in the sense that data
holders are not forced to supply data and related services, but these
approaches harness economic incentives to help overcome the natural
human reluctance to share. The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,30 enacted in 2009 as part
of economic stimulus legislation,31 called for changes to the HIPAA
Privacy Rule. HITECH recognized that donative approaches to data
access, by themselves, may be unable to meet the needs of important
research and public health activities that require access to health data.
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) initiated proceedings32 in 2010 to
modernize the HIPAA Privacy Rule and to implement the HITECH Act.
The final amendments appeared in the Omnibus HIPAA Privacy Rule
revisions published in January 2013.33 This article explores how the
amended HIPAA Privacy Rule approaches the problem of ensuring
access to data for research and public health uses, including
pharmacoepidemiological studies.

II. The HITECH Act’s Regulated Price of Infrastructure Services
The HITECH Act restricts sales of health data34 by making it unlawful for HIPAA-covered entities and their business associates to exchange
an individual’s protected health information (PHI) for direct or indirect

30.

Pub. L. 111-5, Div. A, Title XIII, § 13101, 123 Stat. 228, 242 (2009)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 300jj-19).

31.

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).

32.

Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules
under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. Parts 160 &164).

33.

Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25,
2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).

34.

42 U.S.C. § 17935(d) (Supp. V 2012).
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remuneration unless the individual authorizes the transaction.35 This
restriction does, however, have exceptions.36 These exceptions allow data
holders to receive certain fees in exchange for providing data. As a
result, HITECH moves from a purely donative model of data sharing to
one that envisions at least some use of economic incentives.
When supplying data to researchers under a HIPAA waiver37 (in
other words, without individual authorization), data holders may charge
a price so long as “the price charged reflects the costs of preparation and
transmittal of the data.”38 The HIPAA waiver provision, along with
related provisions for waiving informed consent under the Common
Rule,39 is one of the major pathways for acquiring health data to use in
large-scale studies where it may be impracticable to contact each
individual to obtain a privacy authorization.40 Of importance, HIPAA
waivers do not necessarily require that data be de-identified prior to
sharing, thus making it possible to supply raw data along with the
identifiers that will be needed to assemble the data into longitudinal
health records.41 When granting a waiver, an Institutional Review Board
(IRB) or privacy board approves the sharing of data without the
affected individuals’ permission.42 HITECH allows this practice to
continue so long as data holders do not charge more than the cost-based
fee when supplying data under a waiver.43
HITECH’s cost-based fee is not actually a price for the data. Whether the data holder or the patient “owns” the data is a question of state
law and is murky in many states.44 Data holders obviously cannot sell
35.

§ 17935(d)(1).

36.

§ 17935(d)(2).

37.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2013).

38.

42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(2)(B).

39.

Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §
46.101–124 (2013). See also id. at § 46.116(d) (providing a mechanism for
waiver of informed consent upon approval by an IRB).

40.

COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH & THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO., INST. OF
MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY,
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 167-68 (Sharyl J. Nass, Laura A.
Levit & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2009) [hereinafter IOM, PRIVACY
REPORT], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12458.html.

41.

See, e.g., Evans, Authority of the FDA, supra note 9, at 76-77.

42.

Id.

43.

42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(2)(B) (allowing sales priced at the cost-based fee
under the Privacy Rule’s waiver provision, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i), which
allows disclosure to researchers without individual authorization).

44.

See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2055, 2076-94 (2004) (discussing conceptual difficulties in applying
property rights to information held in databases); David L. Silverman,
Data Security Breaches: The State of Notification Laws, 19 INTELL. PROP.
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the data if they do not legally own it.45 What data holders own is the
health information infrastructure (computer systems, software, and
communications equipment) that supports their regular business activities. The cost-based fee is intended to cover infrastructure services:
services that data holders perform to prepare and transmit data with the
use of their information infrastructures.46 Colloquially, the phrase “data
provisioning” is sometimes used to describe services that make data
available to users, and this article uses that phrase as shorthand for data
preparation and transmittal. The data are supplied gratis, and the
HITECH Act’s fee47 covers services a data holder provides during the
process of supplying the data. Whether the public whose data are being
trafficked will understand this nuance is not clear.
HHS recently implemented HITECH’s cost-based fee by amending
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.48 The amended HIPAA regulations define
“sale of protected health information” as a “disclosure of protected
health information by a covered entity or business associate” where the
disclosing entity “directly or indirectly receives remuneration from or on
behalf of the recipient of the protected health information in exchange
for the protected health information.”49 The HIPAA regulations, like
HITECH, then provide various exceptions to this basic definition.50
One exception is that disclosures for public health purposes are not
considered sales of PHI.51 This exception includes disclosures made under
the existing HIPAA exception that allows unconsented use of data for
various public health uses,52 and it also includes public health uses of
limited data sets.53 Another exception covers disclosures of data for use
in research under the HIPAA waiver provision54 or as a limited data set.
& TECH. L. J. 5, 8 (2007) (noting that “ownership of the contents of a
database is a precarious concept in the United States.”).
45.

Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information,
301 JAMA 1282, 1282-84 (2009); Silverman, supra note 44, at 8.

46.

42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(2)(B).

47.

Id.

48.

See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules under the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed.
Reg. 5566, 5655 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.410).

49.

78 Fed. Reg. at 5697 (inserting a definition of “sale of protected health
information” at 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(1)).

50.

45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2).

51.

§ 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(i).

52.

§ 164.512(b).

53.

§ 164.514(e).

54.

§ 164.512(i).
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Such disclosures are not considered sales of PHI provided the only
remuneration received is “a reasonable cost-based fee to cover the cost to
prepare and transmit the protected health information for such purposes.”55 Thus, research disclosures are subject to a price cap in the form of
the reasonable cost-based fee, whereas public health disclosures are not
subject to a price cap. Sales of PHI are subject to several additional
exceptions that are not relevant to this discussion.56 Also, PHI can be
sold without any restriction on pricing if the affected individual authorizes the sale after being informed that his or her data is being disclosed
for remuneration.57

III. The Dubious Concept of a Price Elasticity of
Informational Privacy
HIPAA’s new cost-based fee for data preparation and transmission
echoes pricing schemes traditionally used in other infrastructure industries. Cost-of-service pricing was widely used in American infrastructure
regulation dating back to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,58 which
regulated railroads. Congress subsequently imposed it on the interstate
shipping,59 stockyard,60 telephone,61 telegraph,62 trucking,63 electricity,64
natural gas,65 and aviation66 industries.67 This form of economic regulation continued to be common until late in the twentieth century, when it
55.

§ 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(ii).

56.

§ 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(iii) - (viii).

57.

§ 164.508 (a)(4)(i).

58.

Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.).

59.

Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728, 733–35 (1916) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. app.).

60.

Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181–229b).

61.

Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–614).

62.

Id.

63.

Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).

64.

Federal Water Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).

65.

Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch 556, 52 Stat. 821 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717-717w).

66.

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (codified as amended
and before repeal at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).

67.

Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1333-34 (1998).
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was partially replaced by market-based reforms68 that sought, when
competitive conditions allowed, to let market forces play a greater role in
establishing the price of infrastructure services.69 Because of the somewhat diminished role70 cost-of-service pricing now plays in many
infrastructure industries, this article draws heavily on a respected older
treatise71 describing its development in U.S. federal regulatory practice
before subsequent market-oriented reforms.
HITECH’s embrace of regulated, cost-based fees for data provisioning is not easily explained as a response to market imperfections.
Historically, many infrastructure industries have exhibited natural
monopoly characteristics or other structural problems that made it
unwise to let prices be set by market forces.72 These concerns supplied
the rationale for imposing cost-based pricing schemes on many infrastructure industries over the years.73 However, the market for data
provisioning is still immature, and it is too soon to speculate whether or
when similar problems may emerge. There appears to be no evidence at
this point that market-based pricing would lead to monopolistic abuses
of researchers and other data users.
A different rationale seems to be motivating HIPAA’s cost-based fee
structure. Phillips describes an equity-stability theory of price regulation
68.

See Chen, supra note 27, at 1618 (reviewing GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note
27).

69.

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 67, at 1333–40.

70.

While cost-of-service pricing plays a less prominent role now than it did
before the final quarter of the twentieth century, it continues to be widely
used, for example, in federal regulation of segments of interstate
infrastructure industries where competitive conditions do not support
reliance on market-oriented pricing. It also is heavily used in state and
municipal regulation of municipal utility distribution systems since local
utility services often are not subject to competition from multiple service
providers, making market pricing problematic.

71.

CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1993).

72.

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 67, at 1334. See also GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra
note 27, at 4-6 (discussing rationales for infrastructure regulation);
PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 51-60 (discussing natural monopoly
characteristics and structural issues that may call for price regulation);
Hank Intven et al., Module 1-Overview of Telecommunications Regulation,
in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION HANDBOOK § 1.1.1 box 1-1 (Hank
Intven
ed.,
2000)
available
at
http://www.infodev.org/articles/telecommunications-regulation-handbook1st-edition (stating that one objective of regulation is to “prevent abuses of
market power such as excessive pricing and anticompetitive behaviour” in
situations where markets do not exist); id. at §§ 5.2.2 – 5.2.4 (discussing
specific market imperfections common in infrastructure industries such as
telecommunications).

73.

PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 182-83; GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 27, at 5-6.
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in which Congress regulates prices to keep market forces from undermining valued social goals such as fairness and equity.74 In the telecommunitelecommunications sector, protecting consumers’ privacy rights is seen
as a legitimate rationale for regulation75 (albeit not necessarily for price
regulation). By placing the cost-based fee in a section of the HITECH
Act amending the HIPAA Privacy Rule,76 Congress appears to have been
invoking price regulation as an instrument of privacy policy rather than
economic policy. This cap on fees is not to protect researchers from price
gouging. Instead, the protected class for this regulation is people whose
data are in health databases.
Congress apparently was concerned that market-based pricing might
over-stimulate research use of data and thereby expose people whose
data are in health databases to excess privacy risks. This posits a
functional relationship between the fees researchers pay for data and the
informational privacy of the people whose data are used —a “price
elasticity of privacy” so to speak. If such a relationship exists at all, it is
a murky one. Whether privacy and data security protections are strong
or weak does not depend on whether a person’s health record is being
sold for three dollars or three hundred dollars. It depends on many other
matters such as the information practices and data security measures
implemented by the supplier and user of the data and how well privacy
policies are monitored and enforced.77
It is not clear whether a higher fee or a lower fee would better serve
to reduce people’s privacy risks. Allowing data holders to charge a high
fee may create supply-side incentives to develop health information
systems that facilitate flows of data to researchers, and it may entice
data holders to go to the trouble to make their data available for
research. Viewed this way, a higher fee seemingly would stimulate
development of a “market for data” with its attendant privacy risks. On
the other hand, a higher fee would tend to suppress researchers’ demand
for data, thus reducing people’s exposure to research-related privacy
risks. The net effect on privacy is hard to predict.
Congress appears to have assumed that the supply of data is, at present, constrained by infrastructure —that is, research use of health data
is being limited by a lack of interoperable information systems to supply
the data to researchers. Under this assumption, lower fees might tend to
protect privacy by reducing data holders’ incentives to install infrastruc74.

PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 187.

75.

Intven et al., supra note 72, at § 1.1.1 box 1-1.

76.

42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2012).

77.

See, e.g., MARKLE FOUND., THE CONNECTING FOR HEALTH COMMON
FRAMEWORK: OVERVIEW AND PRINCIPLES (2006), available at
http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/Overview_Professionals.pdf
(discussing principles and practices that affect privacy protection in a
networked health information environment).
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ture needed to “debottleneck” the flow of data to researchers. This
assumption helps explain an apparent anomaly in the HITECH Act:
Congress chose not to limit the fees data holders can charge when
supplying data for public health uses,78 even as it capped the fees for
data used in research. At first it seems wrongheaded for data holders to
charge higher fees for public health uses of data, which traditionally
have been considered to have a greater social value than research.79 Yet
this policy makes sense under an assumption that the data supply, at
present, is infrastructure-constrained. Under such conditions, a higher fee
would help support investment in needed systems80 to resolve the
constraint, thus promoting wider availability of data for use by public
health agencies. By letting them pay more than researchers can pay for
data provisioning, Congress was helping ensure adequate flows of data to
important public health uses. Later, when America has finished installing its health IT infrastructure, it may make sense to limit the fees
for public health uses. The HITECH Act allows the Secretary of HHS to
impose such a cap at a later time81 based on an evaluation of how it may
affect availability of data.82 HHS evaluated whether this cost-based fee
structure also should apply to data supplied to public health users,83 but
ultimately chose not to cap the remuneration a data holder can receive
for data destined for public health uses.84
Concerning research, the question is whether infrastructure constraints really do protect privacy by limiting research uses of data. If so,
capping fees would be an effective strategy for protecting privacy insofar
as it limits infrastructure installation and chokes flows of data to
researchers.85 Yet many data holders –such as large health insurers that
already have sophisticated information systems in place –stand ready to
78.

Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules
under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868, 40,921 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(4)(ii)(A)).

79.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 47 (2d ed. 2008)
(discussing the high value traditionally accorded to public health
activities).

80.

PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 172 (noting the necessity of adequate earnings
to support development and expansion of the industry).

81.

42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(3)(B) (Supp. V 2012).

82.

Id.

83.

75 Fed. Reg. at 40,891.

84.

Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules
under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5605-06 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).

85.

Whether it is a good policy to protect privacy at the expense of research is
a separate issue not relevant to the immediate discussion.
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supply data to researchers using existing infrastructure for which capital
outlays already have been made.86 For these data holders, higher fees will
not necessarily stimulate investments in infrastructure. Limiting fees, as
Congress has done, may have the opposite effect of stimulating demand
for their data and increasing overall research use (and privacy risks).
This is not to deny that many data holders are still in the process of
installing health IT systems; for these, a fee cap may indeed constrain
investments, hinder data delivery to researchers, and decrease privacy
risks.
Privacy advocates need to nuance their positions in recognition that
the relationship between the fee level and privacy risks is largely unknown and is likely to evolve over time. As an instrument of privacy
policy, a fee cap is highly experimental and, frankly, a bit strange.

IV. Constitutionally Required Elements of Cost-based
Fees for Infrastructure Services
During the rulemaking to amend the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS
sought public comment on how to define the cost-based fee: which cost
items should and should not be included?87 The agency received exten-

86.

See Alexis Ogdie et al., Medical Record Databases, in
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY 217-346 (Brian L. Strom, et al. eds., 4th ed.
2005)
(describing
various
databases
already
in
use
in
pharmacoepidemiology research); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
HEALTH PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: PANEL ON
PERFORMANCE MEASURES & DATA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PERFORMANCE
PARTNERSHIP GRANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 95 (Edward B. Perrin et
al.
eds.,
1999),
available
at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309064368
(discussing
administrative databases and their use in observational research); Peter Ian
Pillans, Clinical Perspectives in Drug Safety and Adverse Drug Reactions,
1 EXPERT REV. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 695, 697 (2008). (noting the
expanded availability and improved quality of these databases); Jed
Weissberg, Use of Large System Databases, in INST. OF MED., THE
LEARNING HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 46 (LeighAnne
Olsen
et
al.
eds.,
2007),
available
at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11903
(describing
observational research with a large HMO clinical database); Fred D.
Brenneman et al., Outcomes Research in Surgery, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY
1220, 1220 (1999) (noting that modern cohort and registry studies use large
administrative databases, such as claims databases maintained by health
insurers, and large clinical databases).

87.

Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868, 40, 891 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. Parts 160 &164) (seeking public comment on what should be
included in the cost-based fee).
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sive comments on this issue.88 In the preamble to the final rule,89 HHS
stated:
In response to comments about the types of costs that are permitted in the reasonable cost-based fee to prepare and transmit data,
we clarify that this may include both direct and indirect costs, including labor, materials, and supplies for generating, storing,
retrieving and transmitting the protected heath information: labor
and supplies to ensure the protected health information is disclosed in a permissible manner; as well as related capital and
overhead costs. However, fees charged to incur a profit from the
disclosure of protected heath information are not allowed.90

This section explains why the above interpretation is legally problematic. To summarize, the words “reasonable” and “cost-based” have
well-developed meanings in U.S. infrastructure regulation. These meanings have been shaped by over a century of Supreme Court cases
examining cost-based pricing structures in various infrastructure industries. The HITECH Act’s reasonable cost-based fee, as HHS interprets it,
does not satisfy constitutional requirements established in all the other
contexts where cost-of-service pricing has been employed. HIPAA’s costbased fee has been set so low that it presents constitutional questions
and it may chill incentives to invest in needed informational infrastructures to support postmarketing medical product surveillance and other
socially valuable research and public health activities.
Conceptually, a fee for data preparation and transmittal should meet
several criteria. For example, it should be high enough to encourage
private data holders to invest in information systems to support flows of
data to socially beneficial studies. At the same time, it should be low
enough to make important observational studies affordable, and the fee
88.

See, e.g., Comment from Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. et al., Docket No.
2010-16718, REGULATIONS.GOV (Sept. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480dc0881
&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw12; Comment from Barbara
J. Evans, Docket No. 2010-16718, REGULATIONS.GOV (Sept. 10, 2010),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480dc073f
&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8; Comment from Kristen
Rosati, Nat’l Cancer Inst. et al., Docket No. 2010-16718, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Sept.
13,
2010),
available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480dc087f
&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw12.

89.

Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5607
(Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).

90.

Id.
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should be set with regard to the potential privacy impacts (as ambiguous
as they are).
HHS has constraints on its discretion to peg the fee to a conceptually “ideal” level, even if all stakeholders could agree what is ideal. In
particular, there are constitutional constraints. HHS is obliged to heed
constitutional requirements enunciated in other infrastructure regulatory
contexts. Health information technology (IT) infrastructure is infrastructure and, as such, it falls into this line of precedents.91 Professor GómezIbáñez defines infrastructure as “networks that distribute products or
services over geographical space.”92 Large health data systems and
interoperable networks meet this definition; indeed, so does a physician’s
office fax machine when hooked up to a phone line.
In theory there are various options for setting a cost-based fee, differing according to which costs are covered by the fee. At the lower
limit, the fee would cover just the incremental (variable) operating costs
of responding to researchers’ requests for data. Such costs might include,
for example, wages paid to personnel for time spent retrieving, copying,
and processing data that meet the researcher’s specifications and costs of
the data transmittal. Many members of the public, bioethicists, and
privacy advocates might wish for HHS to limit the fee to this level since
this would eliminate any profit on the unauthorized sale of data, deter
investment in interoperable health IT systems, and chill development of
a market for nonconsensual research use of data. Even if it were desirable, as a policy matter, to deter private investment in America’s health
IT infrastructure, there would be real constitutional problems with
setting the fee at a level that only lets data holders recover their variable
operating costs.
The problem with such a fee is that it is “confiscatory,” a venerable
concept dating back to 1913 in infrastructure rate litigation.93 A variable
cost-only fee would be analogous to letting a railroad charge its passengers only for diesel fuel and wages paid to the engineer and conductors
while the passenger actually was riding the train, but ignoring the
capital costs of the train itself and the tracks on which it runs. In an
1890 railroad rate case, the Supreme Court noted that a “reasonable”

91.

PHILLIPS, supra note 71 (providing a detailed discussion of judicial
decisions affecting cost-of-service rates for infrastructure services in several
industries).

92.

GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 27, at 4.

93.

See David R. Stras, Pierce Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 695, 706 (2009) (attributing the term “confiscatory” to Pierce
Butler—who later became a Supreme Court justice—in 1913 when he was
still a corporate lawyer representing a group of railroads in the well-known
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913)).
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charge involves an “element of reasonableness both as regards the
company and as regards the public”:94
If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable
rates for the use of its property . . . it is deprived of the lawful use
of its property and thus, in substance and effect, of the property
itself, without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the United States; and in so far as it is thus deprived, while
other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon
their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.95

These basic concerns have guided cost-of-service ratemaking in many
different infrastructure industries over many years. Summarizing this
history, Phillips notes that the Supreme Court “has made it clear that
confiscation of property must be avoided.”96 Moreover, the Court has
required a fair rate of return with “fairness” conceived along three
general dimensions: “financial integrity, capital attraction, and comparable earnings.”97 That is, cost-based rates must be sufficient to give the
regulated company a meaningful prospect of maintaining its financial
position and credit rating, attracting new investment as needed to
continue providing its infrastructure services, and reaping returns in line
with those of other companies whose businesses entail a similar level of
overall risk.98
A reasonable, cost-based fee for data provisioning can and indeed
must include an allowance for recovery of the capital invested to create
the underlying health information infrastructure plus a reasonable rate of
return on that invested capital. A data holder is in a position to respond
to a request for data only because it previously invested to create the
information systems from which the data are being drawn. If the data
holder were limited to a price that shares the benefits of that capital
investment with customers (in this case, the researchers) for free, that
could amount to a taking of the data holder’s capital. Also, singling out
health database operators for earnings restrictions that do not apply to
investors in other types of databases (such as retail sales databases)
could deny equal protection.

94.

Chi. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co v. Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse
Comm’n, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890). See also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (noting that setting just and
reasonable rates “involves a balancing of the investor and consumer
interests”).

95.

Chi. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 134 U.S. at 458.

96.

PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 381.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.
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In addition to capital costs, database operators also have fixed operating costs that are not directly traceable to any specific data request
but which nevertheless must be incurred to keep their systems ready to
respond. An example would be wages for the IT personnel who routinely
keep the system operating and secure, even if they are not personally
involved in responding to data requests. In many infrastructure industries, operating costs are the largest item that must be recovered in
rates,99 and these costs may include significant fixed-cost components
that are not traceable to particular services the system provides.100 A
reasonable cost-based fee for infrastructure services must include an
allowance for recovery of fixed costs, but there is an obvious challenge in
deciding how much of the shared costs each user should pay:
[W]here as here several classes of services have a common use of
the same property, difficulties of separation are obvious. Allocation
of costs is not a matter for the slide-rule. It involves judgment on
a myriad of facts. It has no claim to an exact science.101

“But, despite the difficulties that confessedly attend the proper solution
of such questions,”102 infrastructure service providers are entitled to
recover their fixed costs.103
It is one thing to acknowledge that operating costs (variable and
fixed), capital costs, and a rate of return on capital must be included in
the cost-based fee; it is quite another thing to calculate these figures.
Administering a cost-based fee will require HHS to address several key
issues: (1) valuation of capital investments to be included in the costbased fee; (2) uniform accounting standards for all included cost items;
(3) the cost allocation formula for apportioning capital and fixed
operating costs among various users that receive services from the
system; and (4) the fair rate of return on capital used to provide the
services. In addition, a cost-based pricing scheme requires appropriate
institutional arrangements, including a transparent procedural framework to protect the interests of all affected stakeholders.
1. Capital Valuation. “No other conflict in the history of regulation
has received so much attention or been the subject of so much litigation.”104 A computer, for example, might be valued at its original cost, at
its replacement cost, or at its current depreciated value, to name just

99.

Id. at 255.

100. See, e.g., id. at 179 (“For many public utilities, nonallocable (common or
joint) costs represent a significant percentage of total costs.”).
101. Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945).
102. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527 (1898).
103. PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 176-77.
104. Id. at 315 (discussing capital valuation).
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some of the alternatives105 that have been analyzed, disputed, and
litigated since 1898.106 The Supreme Court has shown willingness to let
regulators exercise considerable discretion in choosing the best approach
for a particular industry,107 and regulators use a variety of methodologies.108 Different methodologies may create different incentives for
industry development and can influence operational practices (such as
the frequency of system upgrades) that may affect reliability, security,
or—in this case—privacy. These impacts will require careful analysis
before HHS adopts a methodology. The decision will need to recognize
that health data holders are diverse, with infrastructure ranging from
simple file cabinets to vast interoperable data networks. The valuation
method(s) may need to reflect their varied circumstances.
2. Uniform System of Accounts. When cost-of-service ratemaking
was in its infancy early in the twentieth century, there were numerous
accounting abuses and “enormous profits often accrued to the unscrupulous.”109 As early as 1912 and 1913, the Supreme Court recognized that
regulators overseeing cost-based fees need to be able to require companies to disclose information about their costs and follow standard
accounting practices for any costs included in the fees.110 Uniform
systems of accounts developed gradually after that, sometimes imposed
by regulators and sometimes developed by the regulated industries
themselves.111 After modern federal infrastructure regulators were
established under the New Deal, they approved uniform systems of
accounts for their industries, sometimes drawing on industry-developed
standards already in use. Despite adjustments over the years, these basic
systems remain in use today.112 The principles embodied in these systems
105. Id. at 331-55 (discussing alternative valuation methodologies).
106. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546-47 (1898) (discussing factors to consider in
assessing the fair value of property, such as “original cost of construction,
the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market
value of [the infrastructure owner’s] bonds and stocks, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction . . .”).
107. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 617-18
(1944) (“Congress has entrusted the administration of the [Natural Gas]
Act to the Commission not to the courts. Apart from the requirements of
judicial review it is not for us to advise the Commission how to discharge
its functions.”). The notion here is that courts generally should leave
questions of rate methodology to the responsible regulatory agency and
intervene only in instances of clear injustice.
108. PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 338-40 (providing examples of methodologies
used by various federal and state infrastructure regulators).
109. Id. at 215.
110. Kan. City S. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 442-43 (1913); Interstate
Commerce Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 211 (1912).
111. PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 219.
112. See id. at 220.
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can inform HHS’s efforts to develop a uniform system of accounts for the
cost-based data provisioning fee.
Health database operators and service providers would be well advised to work together to propose an industry consensus standard based
on their intimate knowledge of their own cost structures. Lessons from
the early twentieth century strongly suggest, however, that a knowledgeable regulator needs to oversee the final decision, since industrydeveloped standards may endorse accounting practices that disfavor
other stakeholder groups.113 Ongoing oversight is essential after standards are in place to ensure they are being followed.
3. Cost Allocation. Cost allocation also presents tough analytical
issues.114 In the context of health information infrastructure, these
choices also may be rife with ethical complexities and problems of public
trust. Taking an insurance data system as an example, the infrastructure
may be providing services to several user groups: (1) health insurance
beneficiaries —the people whose data are in the system —for whom it is
used to process insurance claims; (2) public health agencies that occasionally request data to further their public health missions; and (3)
researchers that receive provisioning of data. How much of the capital
and fixed operating costs of the system should each group be expected to
cover? That is the question that cost allocation addresses.
At present, the capital and fixed costs of health insurance data systems presumably are being paid entirely by insurance beneficiaries whose
insurance rates include pass-through of their insurers’ administrative
costs. To expect these people to continue bearing all of these costs would
be unjust in an environment where the system is providing services to
other paying user groups. Under HIPAA’s waiver provisions, insured
persons already must endure the dignitary injury of having their data
used without their permission; must they suffer the additional indignity
of having to subsidize unconsented uses of their data? This would be a
recipe for public outrage.
This example suggests why cost allocation issues traditionally have
been a contentious matter in cost-of-service pricing. If researchers do not
pay at least some of the capital and fixed operating costs of the systems
that supply them with data, this may invite state insurance regulatory
agencies to second guess how HHS’s cost-based fee should be calculated
in their states. Admittedly their power to do so is somewhat limited.
The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)115 preempts state regulation of a large part of the overall health
insurance market, the self-insured employer-sponsored health plans.116
113. See id. at 219.
114. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012).
116. See ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (providing for broad
general ERISA preemption of state law); see also ERISA, § 514(b), 29
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Even when ERISA preemption is not an issue, not all states regulate
health insurance premiums, and among those that do, regulation often is
focused on specific segments of the market such as individual and small
group plans.117 Finally, the vast majority of costs included in health
insurance premiums reflect payments made for beneficiaries’ health care;
insurers’ administrative costs are but a small portion of their overall
costs,118 and health information systems are but a portion of administrative costs. Still, insurance regulators in some states have authority to
inquire into insurers’ cost structures and may take an interest in HHS’s
formula for allocating information system costs as between insurance
beneficiaries and other users of the system.119 Other federal infrastructure
regulators have many years’ experience devising allocation formulas that,
while never universally loved, at least struck stable compromises.120 Their
approaches offer possible concepts for HHS to consider as it implements
HIPAA’s cost-based fee.
One of a regulator’s key duties, with respect to cost allocation, is to
prevent capital and other fixed costs from being disproportionately
loaded onto users in the weakest bargaining position —typically, the
unorganized mass of ordinary users who have few options to change
suppliers.121 Insured Americans are largely captive with little choice over
U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2012) (providing a “savings” clause that
exempts certain categories of state laws, including laws regulating
insurance, from ERISA preemption, but providing a “deemer” clause that
has the effect of causing ERISA preemption to apply in cases involving
self-insured ERISA health plans).
117. See, e.g., FAMILIES U.S.A., ISSUE BRIEF: UNDERSTANDING HOW HEALTH
INSURANCE PREMIUMS ARE REGULATED 2, 5 (2006), available at
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/private-insurance/rate-regulation-1table-of-contents.html (discussing state insurance regulation and providing
figures for the number of states that regulate premiums for individual and
small group policies).
118. Id. at 1 (noting that a goal of regulators and lawmakers is to ensure that
the majority of premium dollars are actually used to pay healthcare claims
rather than for administration or profits).
119. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-701, PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE: STATE OVERSIGHT OF PREMIUM RATES 10, 12 tbl. 1 (2011)
(indicating that 48 of the 50 states reported that they reviewed rate filings
in at least some segments of the health insurance market in 2010 and that
32 of these states reported that their review process includes scrutiny of
health insurers’ administrative costs).
120. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 455, 459-61 (discussing cost allocation
in the electric power industry); id. at 490-91, 503-04 (discussing allocation
methods in the natural gas production and transmission industries); id. at
225-27 (discussing allocation methods in the telephone industry); id. at
652-54 (discussing allocation in federal electricity infrastructure projects);
id. at 842 (discussing allocation methods in the water industry).
121. Id. at 179.
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the insurance plan their employer or government arranges for them.122
This fact does not justify making them bear the full brunt of health IT
capital and operating costs. Researchers and other users, including
public health agencies, must bear their own fair share of these costs
when they receive infrastructure services. That share may be very small
to the extent a user only makes occasional requests for data. Allocation
formulas rely on metrics to assess each user group’s share of overall
system usage —for example, the number of requests made for information services, the number of records accessed, etc. —and costs are
allocated in proportion to each group’s past or projected usage.123 There
is no single, best set of metrics to use,124 and a regulator must use its
discretion to develop metrics that are generally reasonable and fair to all
user groups.
Costs of providing IRB and privacy board review present an interesting cost allocation problem. Infrastructure shareholders are not
expected to absorb the routine costs of ensuring lawful, socially responsible operations; they are allowed to pass these costs to their customers
in rates.125 Thus an energy utility would expect its rates to cover legal
and consulting fees incurred to make sure that energy is delivered in a
lawful, environmentally sound manner. In the same way, a cost-based fee
for data provisioning must include costs incurred for ethical and privacy
review of data requests since this is a cost of routine regulatory compliance when the data holder is subject to the Common Rule or HIPAA
Privacy Rule. The unresolved question is whether these should be
treated as a variable operating cost (billed to the specific researcher
whose request is being reviewed) or a fixed operating cost (allocated
among all users of the system).
Because IRB review costs are directly traceable to particular data
requests, it may seem sensible to treat them as a variable cost of data
preparation and transmittal. Yet there is a problem with this approach:
what happens if the IRB does not approve the transmittal? When an
IRB review is negative, no data provisioning takes place, so there is no
“customer” to which variable costs can be billed as part of data provisioning fees. Variable-cost billing of IRB review costs could create
financial pressure for IRBs to approve all data requests. To avoid this
terrible incentive, the costs of negative IRB reviews might instead be
treated as a fixed cost of doing business. They are indeed fixed to the
122. See Evans, Authority of the FDA, supra note 9, at 102-03.
123. See FAMILIES U.S.A., supra note 117, at 5-6 (providing examples).
124. PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 226 (observing that “any cost allocation
method involves elements of arbitrariness”).
125. Id. at 261 (explaining that routine regulatory compliance costs, such as the
cost of preparing reports required by regulators, are allowed in rates, but
that the cost of fines for failing to comply with applicable laws and
regulations generally is not allowed in rates).
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extent they are not necessarily proportional to the volume of data
provisioning services that a system ultimately provides. The system
operator would then be able to allocate these costs into the fees it
charges to researchers and other users whose requests ethically were able
to be served. Two possible approaches would be:
(1) to treat the costs of all IRB reviews (positive and negative) as
fixed operating costs to be allocated among some or all groups of
system users, or
(2) to bill the costs of positive IRB reviews on a variable cost
basis to the specific researcher whose project was under review, while treating the costs of negative reviews as fixed
costs to be allocated among system users.
To which user groups these costs can be allocated is a question that
would need to be decided in either case. For example, should fixed IRB
review costs be allocated only within the user group of researchers,
whose activities create the need for IRB reviews? Alternatively, should a
portion of the fixed IRB review costs be allocated to the insurance
beneficiaries, whose rights are being protected by IRB reviews (particularly the negative ones)? Any portion of these fixed costs allocated to
researchers would be included in data provisioning fees. Any portion
allocated to insurance beneficiaries would be a business cost reflected in
their insurance rates.
4. Rate of Return. In common usage, selling a thing “at cost” means
that the seller reaps no profit on the transaction. One of the hardest
ratemaking concepts to grasp is that cost-based fees, in American
infrastructure law, include a profit margin —that is, a fair rate of return
on capital used in providing the infrastructure services.126 The infrastructure would not exist unless people had invested capital to build it, and
that capital came from somewhere, such as from a loan on which interest
must be paid or from shareholders who expect to receive dividends. A
rate of return is needed to reimburse these costs of procuring capital.
Denying infrastructure investors the opportunity to earn a return on
their capital would be constitutionally unacceptable. When cost-based
fees are set by a regulator, the regulated pricing formula must allow for
a reasonable rate of return.
The Supreme Court first attempted to define a fair rate of return in
1909,127 and the matter was extensively studied, debated, and litigated
throughout the twentieth century.128 It suffices for present purposes to
note several main principles that have emerged. A reasonable rate of
126. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
127. Willcox v. Consol. Natural Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 48-49 (1909).
128. See PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 375-432 (providing a brief history).
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return is not a unique figure but rather a range of values or a “zone of
reasonableness”129 that may vary over time130 with “circumstances and
locality”131 and in response to the level of business risk.132 Whether a rate
is confiscatory depends on company-specific factors such as the company’s capital structure (debt versus equity) and its cost of attracting
capital as well as on industry-wide and broader economic conditions,
such as the cost of borrowing.133 The requirement that rates be
nonconfiscatory acts as a floor below which rates constitutionally cannot
go.134 However, a reasonable rate of return may be higher than a
nonconfiscatory one. “The mere fact that a rate is nonconfiscatory does
not indicate that it must be deemed to be just and reasonable.”135
The amended HIPAA Privacy Rule limits remuneration to a reasonable, cost-based fee when data are disclosed for research under a waiver
or as a limited data set.136 This implies a rather detailed, companyspecific inquiry into reasonable rates of return for diverse health data
infrastructure providers operating in multiple sectors (insurance, academia, healthcare) and many localities. In other infrastructure sectors
that use cost-based rates, determining the allowed rate of return typically involves proceedings in which companies propose a rate of return and
offer expert testimony and data to support it; other affected stakeholders
are provided an opportunity to present opposing views; the regulator
arrives at a reasoned decision that is subject to judicial review.137
To be clear, there is no guarantee that infrastructure service providers will earn their reasonable rates of return in actual practice. The
129. Id. at 181 (quoting EMERY TROXEL, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 224
(1947)).
130. See, e.g., United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Balt. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249
(1930) (“[A fair rate of return] cannot be settled by invoking decisions of
this court made years ago based upon conditions radically different from
those which prevail to-day. The problem is one to be tested primarily by
present-day conditions.”).
131. Willcox, 212 U.S. at 48.
132. Id. at 48-49.
133. See, e.g., Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923) (identifying factors to consider in determining
whether a rate is confiscatory). See also PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 376-82
(providing a brief history and discussion of standards the court has
enunciated).
134. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974) (“All that is
protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by [a
regulator] be higher than a confiscatory level.”).
135. Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp., 268 U.S. 413, 423 (1925).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(ii) (2013).
137. PHILLIPS, supra note 71, at 188-201 (providing a brief overview of
procedures used by regulatory commissions when setting rates).
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Supreme Court repeatedly has made this clear.138 The Constitution
merely requires that cost-based fees be calculated in a way that offers
companies a realistic potential to earn a reasonable profit. This implies,
for example, that the formula for calculating the fee must not incorporate wildly optimistic assumptions that, in practice, could never be met.
However, infrastructure operators like any other business are subject to
commercial risks. They may fail to realize their projected earnings if, for
example, the demand for data provisioning services falls short of reasonable, but erroneous, forecasts.

V.

Problems with HIPAA’s Cost-based Fee Structure

HIPAA’s cost-based fee for data preparation and transmittal includes all of the elements that are constitutionally required with one
exception: it does not allow health informational infrastructure investors
to earn a reasonable rate of return (profit margin) on their investments.139 As HHS explained in the preamble to the recent HIPAA
amendments, “We believe allowing a profit margin would not be consistent with the language of Section 13405 of the HITECH Act.”
HHS did not clarify its basis for this belief. The HITECH Act makes
no statement about whether the cost-based fee should or should not
include a profit margin. It merely requires that data holders limit
themselves to a cost-based fee when supplying data for research under a
HIPAA waiver.140 Moreover, what the statute says would be irrelevant if
the Constitution states otherwise. As discussed above, the requirement
for cost-based fees to allow investors a prospect of a reasonable profit
margin arises under the U.S. Constitution, which would trump a
conflicting statute. If HHS interprets the HITECH Act as disallowing a
profit margin on health database infrastructure investments, this
interpretation seemingly is entitled to no judicial deference. As the
Tenth Circuit has stated, “[A]n unconstitutional interpretation is not

138. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603
(1944) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S.
575, 590 (1942)) (“[R]egulation does not insure that the business shall
produce net revenues.”); Market St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 324 U.S.
548, 567 (1945) (citing Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 601) (noting
that “regulation does not assure that the regulated business make a
profit”).
139. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5607
(Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 17935(d)(2)(B) (2012) (allowing sales priced at the cost-based
fee under the Privacy Rule’s waiver provision, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i),
which allows disclosure to researchers without individual authorization).
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entitled to Chevron deference.”141 When an agency’s interpretation of a
statute raises serious constitutional questions about the statute-asinterpreted, courts will construe the statute in a way that avoids these
difficulties.142 Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, courts can
be expected to construe the HITECH Act in a way that makes the
statute consistent with the Constitution. HHS’s view that the HITECH
Act does not allow a profit margin seems inconsistent with over 100
years of precedents in other infrastructure industries. The doctrine of
constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron deference.143
It seems unlikely that HHS was deliberately flouting the Constitution. Rather, HHS may simply have preferred to leave it for courts to
decide whether HIPAA’s cost-based fee must include a profit margin.
HHS and OCR have a history of administrative modesty in the face of
constitutional questions that arise under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.144
Rather than attempt to interpret the Constitution themselves, these
agencies display a pattern of avoiding constitutional questions and
leaving them for courts to resolve.145 Thus, the agency may simply have
felt that the courts have superior institutional competence to decide
what, precisely, must be included in HIPAA’s cost-based fee. This fee
does appear to fall under other infrastructure-industry precedents, which
would allow data holders to earn a profit margin on their investments in
health data infrastructure. However, the notion of earning profits in
connection with sharing people’s sensitive health data is fraught with
bioethical as well as constitutional concerns. HHS may have felt that
courts, rather than the agency, are better positioned to decide this
question.
While this question remains unresolved, HIPAA’s cost-based fee
structure arguably is set too far─ below the level necessary to encourage
infrastructure investment and data access to support important public
health and research uses like postmarketing medical product safety
surveillance. The only way to fix this problem seemingly will be to
challenge the constitutionality of HIPAA’s cost-based fee. This challenge
141. U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (referring
to deference to agencies’ interpretation of statutes under Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
142. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979)).
143. Id. at 574.
144. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Institutional Competence to Balance Privacy
and Competing Values: The Forgotten Third Prong of HIPAA Preemption
Analysis, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1216 (2013) (describing how HHS
and OCR chose to leave certain questions about the scope of HIPAA
preemption for courts to resolve).
145. Id.
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could be brought either by data holders who are being denied a reasonable rate of return on their investments in health database infrastructure
or by data users who are being denied access to needed services because
nobody is willing to supply them under HIPAA’s too-low fee structure.
In light of the precedents discussed above, the prospects for a successful
constitutional challenge appear rather good, and such a challenge may
provide the long-term solution to data access problems.
In the meantime, HHS has offered an interim solution. In the preamble to the HIPAA Privacy Rule revisions, the agency provided
guidance that favors the use of distributed data networks. The agency
stated that it does not:
consider sale of protected health information . . . to encompass
payments a covered entity may receive in the form of grants, contracts, or other arrangements to perform programs or activities,
such as a research study, because any provision of protected health
information to the payer is a byproduct of the service being provided.146

This language seems to allow data holders to provide research-related
services in the context of a distributed data network without becoming
subject to HIPAA’s cost-based fee structure. Data holders would be able
to enter contracts to provide services that support distributed data
network operations and to price those services at negotiated, cost-based
rates. Thus, data provided to researchers under HIPAA waivers would
be subject to the cost-based fee cap, but market rates apply when data
holders respond to researchers’ queries within a distributed network
architecture.
This solution does not completely solve the data access problem.
Virtual access to data through a distributed data network ultimately is
not equivalent to actual access under a HIPAA waiver. To achieve fully
integrated network operations, it occasionally is necessary to share some
patient-identifying information outside the privacy firewalls of the
respective data holders that participate in the network.147 Sharing
patient-identifying information outside data holders’ privacy firewalls
requires either individual authorization or a HIPAA waiver, and this
remains true even when the data holder is participating in a distributed
data network. At the point when HIPAA waivers are required, the costbased fee structure once again becomes relevant. To the extent the costbased fee is set at a confiscatory level, this may chill incentives for data
holders to participate.
146. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5606
(Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
147. See Evans, Authority of the FDA, supra note 9, at 76-77.
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VI. Administering HIPAA’s Cost-based Fee
Apart from the overall level of HIPAA’s cost-based fee, there is the
question of how this fee will be administered. OCR has been thrust into
the role of a traditional infrastructure regulator charged with administering cost-of-service pricing. This role lies outside OCR’s traditional
regulatory competence, which is to oversee the privacy and security of
health information and to ensure that people have equal access, without
unlawful discrimination, to services from HHS-funded programs such as
Medicare.148
OCR is not staffed at a level to carry out this new role. In 2010
when HIPAA’s cost-based fee was proposed, OCR had 270 full time
equivalent (FTE) employees,149 over 180 of which were at its ten regional
offices,150 and there were only 28 employees in OCR’s Health Information
Privacy Division.151 This reflected a significant expansion over OCR’s
2009 staffing level of 227 FTE employees.152 The HITECH Act provided
for some expansion of OCR’s staffing, such as appointing one privacy
advisor for each regional office and expanding public education programs.153 Even so, OCR anticipated only a ten-person staffing increase
between 2010 to 2011 (moving from 270 to 280 with the Health Information Privacy Division remaining steady at 28 FTE employees).154
At these staffing levels, OCR’s auditing, enforcement, and oversight
of HIPAA Privacy Rule compliance were necessarily light even before
passage of the HITECH Act.155 These staffing levels appear wholly
inadequate to administer a cost-based pricing scheme, at least if this is
to be done in-house by OCR itself. For comparison, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which even after market-oriented
reforms continues to administer cost-of-service rates in the interstate
transmission segments of the electricity, oil, and natural gas industries,
has around 1,300 personnel.156 The Federal Communications Commission

148. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2011 JUSTIFICATION
OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 5, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/office/about/cj2011.pdf.
149. Id. at 29.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 17-18.
154. Id. at 29.
155. Ron Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, WASH. POST, June 5,
2006, at A1 (reporting that OCR did not impose a single civil fine and
prosecuted only two criminal cases in its first three years of operation).
156. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FY 2006
CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST 1, available at
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(FCC), which continues to regulate aspects of telecommunications rates,
has about 1,800 personnel.157 OCR faces the dual challenge of deciding
the details of the new pricing scheme and developing (or arranging)
institutional capacity to carry it out.
If OCR is not in a position to administer the cost-based fee structure, can this responsibility be delegated to IRBs? The answer is
emphatically “no.” OCR’s proposed regulation correctly framed this very
important issue. The regulation does not engage IRBs or privacy boards
in determining whether fees are reasonable and cost-based: this determination is not listed among the criteria for IRB approval of a waiver.158
Because it is not a waiver criterion, this is not a determination that
IRBs must make when approving disclosure of data for research under a
waiver. The requirement of reasonable, cost-based fees appears elsewhere
in the regulation.159 It is a precondition of selling people’s data pursuant
to a waiver, but the proposed rule did not envision that IRBs would be
responsible for making sure this precondition is met.160 In the preamble
to the final rule, HHS confirmed that IRBs are not responsible for
ensuring that the fees received, when data are disclosed for research
under a HIPAA waiver, are reasonable and cost-based.161
HHS instead stated that covered entities and business associates are
responsible for ensuring that any fees they receive meet this condition.162
Unfortunately, there is no way for them to do so unless the agency
supplies clear guidance on permissible capital valuation methods,
accounting conventions, cost allocation formulas, and the many other
http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-docs/FY06-budg.pdf (requesting a full
year 2006 budget of $220 million and 1295 employees).
157. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 2007 ANNUAL FCC EMPLOYEE SURVEY RESPONSES
2, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC280549A1.pdf (reporting 1814 employees as of November 2007).
158. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii) (2013) (listing criteria that an IRB or
privacy board must determine have been met, before approving a waiver of
individual privacy authorization).
159. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(ii).
160. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868, 40,922 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. Parts 160 &164) (amending the waiver provisions at § 164.512(i)
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule but not adding a requirement for IRB’s to
determine that fees are reasonable and cost based when approving a
waiver).
161. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5608-09
(Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
162. Id. at 5609.
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aspects of a cost-based fee calculation. HHS has not yet done so and
merely stated an intention “to work with the research community to
provide guidance and help the research community reach a common
understanding of appropriate cost-based limitations on remuneration.”163
One thing is clear: HHS was entirely correct in concluding that IRBs
should not be involved in administering the cost-based fee structure.
IRBs and privacy boards have no competence to assess whether fees
charged on specific data transactions are reasonable or cost-based.
Moreover, it would be deeply problematic from the standpoints of due
process and good regulatory practice for them to do so.
Apart from the fact that IRBs typically are staffed by biomedical
researchers, physicians, and bioethicists who have no experience with
cost-of-service pricing methodologies, IRBs have conflicts of interest that
preclude their involvement in decisions of this type. Independence is
fundamental to the legitimacy of infrastructure regulatory decisions.164
Smith defines independence in terms of three elements: (1) “[a]n arm’slength relationship with regulated firms, consumers, and other private
interests;” (2) “[a]n arm’s-length relationship with political authorities;”
and (3) “[t]he attributes of organizational autonomy”—such as adequately trained staff and stable funding to support oversight activities—”to
foster the requisite expertise to underpin those arm’s-length relationships.”165 IRBs are not independent decision makers in this sense.
The HIPAA privacy rule lets waivers be approved by an IRB or privacy board located either at the institution supplying the data or at the
institution requesting the data. When promulgating waiver provisions of
the initial HIPAA Privacy Rule in December 2000, HHS expressly
rejected suggestions that review by an outside, disinterested review body
should be required.166 IRBs and privacy boards make heavy use of
voluntary staffing by insiders (employees) of the institutions whose
transactions are being regulated. Having no independent source of
163. Id. at 5607.
164. Intven et al., supra note 72, at §1.2.2.2.
165. Warrick Smith, Utility Regulators—The Independence Debate, VIEWPOINT,
Oct.
1997,
at
1,
available
at
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11570/mul
ti0page.pdf?sequence=1 (describing infrastructure regulatory arrangements
in which a regulatory decision maker is granted substantial discretion to
set prices and services standards for the regulated firm).
166. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,695 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.
160, 164) (rejecting, in the preamble to the final HIPAA Privacy Rule
promulgated in 2000, public comments that suggested that outside review
should be required; reaffirming the proposed rule’s policy of imposing no
requirements for the location or sponsorship of the IRB or privacy board
that approves a waiver; and reaffirming that the review can occur either at
the data-supplying or data-requesting institution).
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funding, these bodies usually depend on the regulated institutions to
support their activities.167 To let such bodies determine that fees for data
sales are “reasonable” and “cost-based” would be like letting insiders at
an electric power company set its rates.
Alternatively, a so-called “independent IRB”168 can be hired to perform functions such as approving waivers and determining whether fees
are cost-based. A better adjective for these review bodies would be
“unaffiliated” or “stand-alone;” they are not independent in the regulatory sense of the word.169 These bodies are commercial businesses that
work for a fee; the fees typically are paid by either the institution
supplying or requesting the data. This financial relationship with an
interested party would disqualify them from deciding rate issues under
the most minimal norms of good regulatory practice followed not only in
developed but in developing economies around the world.170
Regardless whether they are unaffiliated or operating within the regulated institutions, IRBs and privacy boards are not subject even to the
most rudimentary norms of due process such as the Administrative
Procedure Act’s requirements of reasoned, evidence-based decisionmaking due process rights for affected parties, reviewable records, and
167. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM ii, 7-8 (1998),
available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00193.pdf
(discussing problems with independence of IRBs in the context of their
traditional role of providing ethical review of research); see also Evans,
Congress’ New Infrastructural Model, supra note 9, at 623-65; Evans,
Authority of the FDA, supra note 9, at 103-05 (discussing problems with
the lack of independence of these bodies and the lax procedural norms they
follow).
168. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT
BOARDS I (1998) [hereinafter OIG, INDEPENDENT IRBS], available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00192.pdf (defining “independent
IRBs” as “entities working outside institutions where research is
performed”).
169. See Smith, supra note 165.
170. An arm’s length relationship between regulatory decision-makers and
regulated companies is so basic that its absence gives rise to the
presumption that a legitimate regulatory framework is not in place. See,
e.g., Robert Bacon, A Scorecard for Energy Reform in Developing
Countries, VIEWPOINT, April 1999, at 2 box 1, available at
http://rru.worldbank.org.documents/publicpolicyjournal/175bacon.pdf
(surveying 115 developing countries to ascertain whether they had or had
not instituted effective regulatory frameworks based on six criteria—such
as whether the nations had passed regulatory laws and whether they had
completed various restructuring and privatization steps within the
regulated industries—and applying a single criterion to judge whether
appropriate regulatory decision making bodies were in place: was there a
regulator that was separate from the regulated companies and from
political authorities).
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rights of appeal.171 Involving these review bodies in cost-based fee
determinations is inappropriate.172 “What is most important in this
regard is separation of the regulator from the [infrastructure] operator(s)
in the market. Such separation inspires market confidence . . . .”173
If OCR, within its current resource constraints, cannot do this job
and if IRBs and privacy boards should not do it, this leads inescapably
to the conclusion that other institutional arrangements will have to be
made. The most straightforward would be to form a special, independent
commission charged with overseeing development and administration of
the cost-based fee for data preparation and transmission. It is fairly
common, when implementing new regulatory frameworks, to have to
develop special-purpose oversight bodies from scratch.174 This carries
with it the task of establishing a means of funding the costs of running
these bodies.175 Neither of these problems is novel and both have been
resolved successfully many times in recent decades as infrastructure
privatizations around the world created a need for new oversight bodies
to regulate the newly privatized sectors.
There are various ways a special commission could be organized.
One approach would be to establish it within a federal agency such as
OCR or HHS – in other words, to provide traditional governmental
oversight176 of the cost-based fee structure. In modern practice, it is
accepted that this approach does not always provide optimal oversight
because of problems like information asymmetries and agency staffing
and resource constraints.177 The trend in recent years has been toward
greater reliance178 on arrangements in which the agency delegates some
or all of the oversight activities to nongovernmental actors.179
171. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012); Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing
Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 13–17
(2004); Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model, supra note 9, at 62324; Evans, Authority of the FDA, supra note 9, at 103-05.
172. See OIG, INDEPENDENT IRBS, supra note 168.
173. Intven et al., supra note 72, at §1.2.2.1.
174. Smith, supra note 165, at 1.
175. Id. at 3 (discussing issues that must be addressed when creating new
regulatory bodies). See also Intven et al., supra note 72, at §1.2.2.2 (“It is
essential to provide adequate funding for the regulatory process. Funding is
required to hire good caliber professional staff and consultants that can
implement regulatory objectives. Without adequate funding, regulation will
not usually be effective.”).
176. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1325-26 (2003) [hereinafter Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms].
177. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J.
647, 670-71 (1986).
178. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 551-56 (2000) [hereinafter, Freeman, Private Role] (discussing the
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Public-private collaborations (also called public-private partnerships)180 of this sort can be structured various ways, for example, by
contracting with private entities to perform specific oversight tasks or
creating a framework for independent private oversight. These possibilities offer a range of intermediate options between the two extremes of
self-regulation (by IRBs and Privacy Boards affiliated with or hired by
parties to the data transaction) and non-delegation (in which OCR
oversees the cost-based fee itself). Under the modern federal private
nondelegation doctrine, a wide array of functions can be delegated to
private actors.181 The constitutions of a few states continue to restrict
private delegations.182 Even so, at all levels of government there are
pervasive role private actors now play both in delivering governmentally
financed public services and in performing functions traditionally regarded
as public functions).
179. For discussion of public-private collaborations, see, e.g., DONALD F. KETTL,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 118 (2002); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV.
397 (2006); Kenneth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE
L.J. 377 (2006); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the AntiAdministrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073-76 (2005); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 176; Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003);
Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Jody Freeman, Private Parties,
Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813
(2000); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155
(2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
180. See, e.g., CATHERINE M. DONNELLY, DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL
POWER TO PRIVATE PARTIES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2007)
(reviewing literature about U.S. federal and state approaches to publicprivate collaborations); KETTL, supra note 179, at 118 (discussing the
recent transformation in which “American governments at all levels
became increasingly interconnected with private corporations and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that share the task of delivering
public services”); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools
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GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. Salamon, ed., 2002) (describing alternatives to
top-down, command-and-control regulation by a governmental agency).
181. See DONNELLY, supra note 180, at 57-60, 117-26 (summarizing modern
federal non-delegation doctrine and noting the extent to which private
delegations of governmental power are allowed in modern practice);
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 178, at 580-81 (noting that the
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Verkuil, supra note 179, at 418, 432.
182. DONNELLY, supra note 180, at 127-35.
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examples of seemingly public functions, including functions associated
with regulatory oversight, delegated to private actors.183 The old
“hierarchial and bureaucratic notion of public action,” which posited a
sharp, clear line between delegable and nondelegable functions, is “badly
out of synch with reality.”184
If OCR does choose to delegate some or all of the functions associated with oversight of HIPAA’s cost-based fee, it will be able harness skills
of numerous private-sector entities that have applied cost-based pricing
principles in other industries such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications. To the extent these entities have not previously worked
in healthcare, academic medicine, or insurance, they would be free of
conflicts for purposes of administering OCR’s data preparation and
transmittal fee. There are many options for involving private bodies in
oversight activities. These could involve the use of (genuinely) independent standard-setting organizations, auditors, or decision making bodies
to help administer the cost-based fee structure.185 Ombudspersons,
independent interest organizations, or legal representatives could be
appointed to represent the interests of affected stakeholder groups such
as the research community and people whose data are in health information systems.186 An independent, private-sector body could be engaged
to help develop procedural standards to ensure appropriate transparency
and accountability.
The matter of procedural standards is critically important when setting up a new oversight body.187 Some functions are sensitive or
problematic to delegate to private bodies; there are analytical frameworks for assessing which functions these are.188 For such functions, it is
183. Verkuil, supra note 179, at 432.
184. Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms, supra note 176, at 1288.
185. See Lawrence, supra note 177, at 686-87 (discussing delegation to a private
but neutral party).
186. See id.
187. Smith, supra note 165, at 2-3.
188. See Christopher K. Leman, Direct Government, in THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 48, 61-62 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002) (discussing factors for identifying inherently
governmental functions that should not be delegated to private actors). See
also Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454,
470, 472 (Tex. 1997) (stating an eight-factor test for assessing whether a
private delegation is problematic, in the context of a case decided under
State non-delegation doctrine); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-92-11,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: ARE SERVICE
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(1991); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
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No.
A-76,
A-2
(May
29,
2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_rev2003.pdf
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important to establish a framework of controls to ensure the oversight
body properly protects the interests of all affected stakeholders. These
typically include a set of policies, such as a conflicts policy to make sure
that the oversight body is truly independent and procedures mimicking
the due process protections that would apply had oversight been provided by a governmental body.189 Such protections typically include
procedural norms to ensure fair and open decision making processes,
respect for individual rights, unbiased decision making, and nondiscriminatory treatment of similarly situated persons.190
There are various ways to fund the oversight body.191 In recent decades the problem of funding regulatory oversight has received a great
deal of attention both in developed and developing nations.192 A key
challenge has been to reduce or avoid reliance on governmental appropriations without undermining the perception of independence.193 One
popular approach has been to require infrastructure owners to receive a
license before they may provide infrastructure services and to levy
licensing fees initially and/or periodically thereafter. This distributes the
cost of providing regulatory oversight among all service providers,
usually in proportion to their share of gross revenues from the infrastructure service in question.194 Thus, data holders could be required to obtain
a license in order to participate in the “market” for provisioning data to
researchers and could be charged licensing fees in proportion to the
annual volume of such services they provide. A related approach, also
widely applied, is user fees in which the suppliers pay for specific

factors for assessing whether a given private delegation is problematic in
ways that call for special controls to protect the interests of all
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(discussing public law norms that should apply to private decision makers
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191. Intven et al., supra note 72, at § 1.2.2.2.
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manuscript),
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regulatory oversight services195 such as having their allowed, cost-based
rates approved on a periodic basis. An example of this latter approach is
the FDA’s reliance on user fees to fund its drug and device approval
processes.196 The disadvantage of both these approaches is that they can
create real or perceived problems with the oversight body’s independence
because the regulatory body in effect is being paid by the industry it
regulates.
From the standpoint of protecting independence, there is a better
approach that is used to fund the work of some U.S. infrastructure
regulatory agencies. This approach levies small fees that are spread
broadly among members of the protected class (in this case, people
whose data are in health information systems) or consumers (in this
case, researchers). The FERC is funded, in part, by a small surcharge
equal to a few cents added to the price of every thousand cubic feet of
natural gas that moves through an interstate pipeline.197 Pipelines collect
the charge from their customers and remit it to the FERC.198 In this
situation, the oversight body is not beholden to the industry it regulates
because it is being paid by those whose interests it is trying to protect.
When OCR sought public comments on how to implement the costbased data provisioning fee,199 the question was posed in the context of a
HIPAA privacy rulemaking. Parties who read and file comments in
HIPAA privacy rulemakings are not the same people who regularly work
with cost-of-service rate regulation in other infrastructure industries
where it is used. There is a real risk that relevant expertise is not being
brought to bear on this important problem. Fortunately, the needed
expertise is widely available in other industrial sectors and will not have
195. See generally Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in
FDA’s New Drug Approval Process: The Prescription Drug Use Fee Act of
1992, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 483 (1992) (discussing the FDA’s reliance on
user fees).
196. See David A. Kessler & David V. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of
FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 485–
86 (2008).
197. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 382.101, 382.202 (2013) (establishing procedures for
“calculating and asserting annual charges to reimburse the United States
for . . . costs incurred by [the FERC],” specifically the costs of the
administration of natural gas regulation, “assessed against each natural gas
pipeline company” in accordance with the proportion of regulated gas it
transported).
198. See 18 C.F.R. § 154.402 (“[A] natural gas pipeline company may adjust its
rates, annually, to recover from its customers annual charges assessed by
the Commission under part 382 of this chapter.”).
199. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868, 40, 891 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. Parts 160 &164) (seeking public comment on what should be
included in the cost-based fee).
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to be developed from scratch. OCR might consider adopting an interim
fee structure while taking steps to harness this expertise to design a
more permanent solution including both a fee design and institutional
arrangements for administering the fee.

Conclusion
HIPAA’s new cost-based fee for data preparation and transmittal
recognizes that purely donative models of data access cannot ensure the
levels of data access and infrastructure development that are needed to
support important research and public health objectives such as
postmarketing medical product safety surveillance. HIPAA’s cost-based
fee structure moves in the direction of harnessing economic incentives to
encourage data access. As with any new approach, it may require a
period of years to work out all the kinks. One important challenge
concerns the overall level of the fee, which presently is so low that it
would be considered confiscatory under judicial precedents established in
other infrastructure industries. HHS has signaled that it does not wish to
decide the permissible rate of return on health database infrastructure
investments and, in effect, has referred this matter to the courts. The
other looming challenge concerns day-to-day administration of HIPAA’s
cost-based fee structure. Here, there are various options available to the
agency, which has signaled its willingness to work with stakeholders to
work out suitable arrangements.
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